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Abstract 
 
 We incorporate elements of a social-constructionist viewpoint into social-exchange 
theory and show how mutual dependence can produce expressive behavior in the form of gift 
giving. Exchange networks typically create varying degrees of mutual dependence in component 
dyads, and greater mutual dependence produces more frequent exchange. We propose that over 
time, frequent exchange generates an expressive relation and unilateral, token gifts are an 
indicator of emerging expressiveness in an exchange relation. To experimentally test the impact 
of mutual dependence on token gift giving, two focal actors, each with one alternative partner, 
attempted to negotiate an exchange across multiple opportunities. The results indicate that high 
compared to low mutual dependence increased gift giving, while also enhancing the attitudinal 
commitment to and perceived closeness of the relation. Consistent with the theory, these effects 
of mutual dependence were indirect, operating through the frequency of exchange. Broadly, the 
paper has theoretical implications for how and when endogenous processes in dyads generate 
certain micro-to-macro effects. 
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 Exchange theory adopts the instrumental premise that actors enter and remain in 
exchange relations to the extent that these provide more benefit than likely from alternative 
relations (Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Emerson 1981). Power dependence theory portrays the 
instrumental foundation as a set of positions and the relations among them—that is, a social 
structure—in which actors pursue their individual interests through interaction with others (Cook 
and Whitmeyer 1992). To the degree that a structure leads the same actors to exchange 
repeatedly over time, an interpersonal relation is likely to form just sis groups tend to form 
around collective experiences and a sense of mutual fate (Rabbie, Schot, and Visser 1989; 
Kramer 1991; Lawler and Yoon 1993). Such a process has important implications for exchange 
networks and raises the possibility of incorporating select features of social-constructionism into 
social-exchange accounts for micro social orders. 
 Broadly, this paper conceptualizes the development of an exchange relation in a network 
as incipient “group formation”.1 The primary focus is how and when mutual dependence in an 
exchange relation produces commitment behavior in the form of token gifts. Mutual dependence 
is the total or average power in an exchange relation (Emerson 1972, 1981; Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992a; Molm 1987, 1990), that is, the average difference between 
prospective payoffs within versus outside the focal relation or CLalt (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Emerson (1972, 1981) termed this “relational cohesion,” thus implying group-formation effects 
for mutual dependence. Token gifts are small, unilateral, unconditional benefits that have the 
shared meaning that actors are willing to “give without expecting anything in return.” Gift giving 
is particularly relevant to exchange relations because under some conditions it suggests the 
transformation of a purely instrumental relation into one with expressive components. We 
interpret such acts as a rudimentary form of everyday ritual behavior, symbolic or expressive of 
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common membership in a relation, group, or organization (see Wuthnow 1987; Collins 1981, 
1989 for relevant discussions of ritual behavior). 
 To understand how structural power might foster ritual behavior, in general, and gift 
giving in particular, this paper builds from common themes of literatures on social exchange 
(Emerson 1972, 1981), the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966), and ritual 
as an everyday phenomenon (Collins 1981, 1989; Turner 1982; Wuthnow 1987). Our general 
theoretical argument is that mutual dependence in an exchange relation (dyad) is likely to 
produce some forms of ritual behavior after an initial period of instrumental exchange; and gift 
giving is a form of special import to exchange theory. There is a long tradition in exchange 
theories of considering gifts as a distinct form of exchange constituting a moral statement or 
definition about the relationship of self and others or self to a larger group (Heath 1976; Ekeh 
1974; Arrow 1972).2 
 In a recent study, Lawler and Yoon (1993) examined whether an emotional/affective 
process mediates the impact of equal versus unequal power dependence on gift giving. They 
treated gift giving as one of two behavioral indicators of commitment in negotiated exchange, 
the other being stay behavior, that is, remaining in a relation despite equal or better alternatives. 
The main argument of their theory was that frequent exchange between the same actors is joint 
behavior that mediates the impact of structural power on gift giving, ostensibly because repeated 
exchange arouses positive feeling or emotion (Lawler and Yoon 1993). Consistent with the 
theory, equal compared to unequal power produced more commitment behavior indirectly by 
enhancing the frequency of exchange and by producing more positive emotion. Lawler and 
Yoon’s (1993) broader interpretation was that frequent exchange makes the exchange relation a 
social object, and members of the dyad become affectively attached to that relation because it is 
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perceived as a source of the positive emotion. In this way, equal power ostensibly produces 
commitment behavior through an emotional/affective process. 
 Considering token gift giving as a form of everyday ritual leads to some important 
theoretical implications that we elaborate in this paper. If gifts are small token items of little 
instrumental value, it seems reasonable to treat them as representing a “ritualized” type of 
commitment behavior. Treating token gifts as ritual does not imply that gifts are the only type of 
ritual or that other forms of commitment (i.e., stay behavior) cannot become ritualized, but it 
does make gift giving a special form of commitment behavior and enables us to graft social 
constructionist ideas about ritual (Berger and Luckmann 1966) onto a social-exchange 
framework. 
 Developing and forging links between exchange theory and social constructionism is 
complicated by the fact that these traditions contain disparate assumptions about actors and 
social systems and also about how to understand or explain social phenomena. We adopt the 
ontological and epistemological approach of exchange theory and suggest that overlapping ideas 
and themes—reflected in concepts of commitment, institutionalization, and ritual—provide the 
basis for building elements of social constructionism into social-exchange theory. Our theory, as 
a variant of social exchange, assumes actors with instrumental ties who interact and can develop 
the sort of emotional bonds that social constructionists and Durkheimians typically assume to be 
present at the outset of the interaction (Durkheim 1915; Collins 1981; Berger and Luckmann 
1966). 
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BACKGROUND 
 
 The following pages elaborate key concepts of ritual and gift giving, and theorize a link 
between the “objectification of an exchange relation” and token gifts as everyday ritual behavior. 
We then formulate several hypotheses about the emergence of gift giving in negotiated exchange 
and test them experimentally. 
 
Concept of Ritual 
 
 The concept of “ritual” has historically been associated with collective experiences that 
affirm for members their common identity, culture, history, or future (Dürkheim 1915; 
Malinowski 1922; Levi-Strauss 1969). The prototype is often taken to be religious ceremonies in 
which actors engage in highly focused and emotional behavior with symbolic meaning. This is a 
fairly limited conceptualization (see Goffman 1967; Collins 1975). Ritual can be construed more 
broadly as any expressive behavior, undertaken for its own sake and symbolic of a tie to larger 
collective—a relation, group, or organization (Collins 1975). Goffman (1967) showed that such 
behaviors are a normal, everyday phenomenon by which actors affirm and shape their ongoing 
relations with other actors. 
 To Goffman (1967), everyday ritual behavior communicates common purpose, shared 
definitions of self and other, and trustworthiness. He emphasized the communicative value of 
ritual in social interaction, treating it as symbolic behavior with a subtle, but clear, practical 
function (see also Turner 1982). Others, such as Berger and Luckmann (1966) emphasize how 
ritual behavior ties individuals to a collective (see also Collins 1975; Wuthnow 1987), which is 
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more relevant to our concerns. Token gift giving, we suggest, reflects an emotional/ affective 
actor-to-collective tie (Lawler and Yoon 1993) and presupposes that actors perceive their relation 
as an objective unit. 
 Berger and Luckmann’s (1966, pp. 53-60) view is that the objectification of a collective 
entity underlies ritual behavior. They suggest two basic conditions for objectification and 
ritualized behavior: (1) the “habitualization” of action, such as, repetitive behavior; and (2) 
“reciprocal typification” or shared definitions of that repetitive behavior. We apply this view to 
emerging exchange relations. Habitualization is treated as a basis for typification, and both of 
these processes are the basis for objectification. Actions are ritualized once they are defined by 
actors as “This is how things are done [here]” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 59). 
Objectification of an exchange relation presupposes “incipient institutionalization” of a line of 
behavior.3 
 Importantly, Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue that “all actions repeated once or more 
tend to be habitualized to some degree” (p. 57), which starts the objectification process. This 
condition, habitualization, is an inherent characteristic of an “exchange relation,” defined by 
Emerson (1981, p. 42) as a “series of transaction by the same actors over time.” Both Berger and 
Luckmann’s social-constructionist and Emerson’s social exchange framework imply that the 
emergence of the social—an incipient social order—stems from repetitive behavior when the 
same people interact. A similar theme is echoed by Collins’ (1975, 1981, 1989) theory of 
interaction ritual chains, which ascribes the source of ritual to emotional energy generated by 
repeated “conversations” among the same actors. In fact, the essential difference between social 
and economic exchange, according to Emerson (1981), is that the interconnections between 
transactions among the same actors produce social effects such as trust and commitment. These 
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effects are social constructions in Berger and Luckmann’s sense, social constructions that reflect 
objectification and incipient group formation (Callero 1991; Kollock and O’Brien 1992). We 
contend that objectification stems from “habitualization” and are likely to be manifest in 
ritualized gift giving in negotiated exchange. 
 The proposition implied by this reasoning is quite simple: Habitualization of interaction 
leads to objectification of a larger social unit [e.g., an exchange relation] which, in turn, 
produces ritual behavior.4 It would be easy to confuse the repetition of exchange with ritual, 
because ritual is so closely associated with habit. However, repeated exchange is not sufficient to 
reflect the symbolic or expressive content of ritual; something more than habit or repetition is 
needed to make the behavior symbolic of a person-to-collective tie and relevant beyond the 
immediate situation. Ritual behavior has significance, beyond the completion of the immediate 
act to the degree that it symbolizes or is expressive of the relations between the individuals or 
group membership (Turner 1982; Callero 1991). In exchange networks, we suggest that token 
gifts can be interpreted as such symbolic expressions (see also Heath 1976). 
 
Concept of Gift Giving 
 
 Gift giving is a complex, multifarious phenomenon, as is evident from the variety of 
conceptions and approaches in the literature (Mauss 1954; Schwartz 1967; Titmuss 1971; Arrow 
1972; Ekeh 1974; Heath 1976; Akerlof 1982, 1984; Haas and Deseran 1981; Caplow 1982, 
1984; Cheal 1986, 1988; Jasso 1993). Exchange approaches generally stress that gifts must be 
reciprocated or they will cease to occur (Emerson 1972; Blau 1977; Caplow 1984; Cheal 1988); 
they look for evidence of implicit, subsurface, long-term reciprocity as an explanation for gift 
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giving (Gouldner 1960). Such approaches also stress that gifts must be costly to the giver to 
impress the other; some even contend that the costs to the giver must be greater than the benefits 
to the receiver (Schwartz 1967), otherwise what appears to be gift giving is simply another way 
for actors to generate joint benefit. Overall, exchange theorists absorb gift giving into a broader 
utilitarian web and attempt to capture how gifts actually enhance the benefits actors receive from 
their relationship (Emerson 1981; Heath 1976; Akerlof 1982, 1984). 
 Social constructionists view gifts as symbolic communications, putting forth a definition 
of a relationship (e.g., Haas and Deseran 1981), an identity (Schwartz 1967), or a sense of 
community (Arrow 1972). Gifts by A communicate to B that A defines the interpersonal relation 
as a trusting, friendly one—and some form of reciprocal action by B confirms that this is a 
shared definition. In a social constructionist account, reciprocity remains central over time, but 
the reciprocation of benefits is not important in itself. Of most importance is evidence of 
reciprocal, convergent definitions of the relation. From this standpoint, the utilitarian value of 
gifts is relatively trivial. 
 Our focus is fairly specific and narrow in this paper. We are concerned with the rate of 
initiating gifts, not reciprocation of them, in a dyadic relation. There is no requirement to give 
and only a slight loss in giving gifts. This is a very rudimentary form of gifts that is designed to 
reflect whether actors are beginning to treat the exchange relation as a positive social object 
toward which expressive acts are directed. Extrapolating from both exchange and social 
constructionist viewpoints, gifts in an exchange relation can be interpreted as ritual behavior if 
they are token (i.e., have little or no extrinsic value), unilateral (i.e., carry the connotation that 
actors are giving without knowing whether the other will), and noncontingent (i.e., there is no 
explicit expectation of reciprocity). It is also important that gifts come from a value domain 
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distinct from those at issue in the exchange (Emerson 1981). The gifts of concern are small, 
minor items with primarily symbolic import. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 We argue that gift giving is the result of an endogenous process through which repetitive 
exchange produces a definition of the relation as a unit. Two sets of hypotheses integrate basic 
ideas from social exchange and social constructionist viewpoints. The first set, based on 
exchange theory (Emerson 1972; Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Molm 1987; Lawler 1992b), 
predicts effects for mutual dependence. The second set, based on both exchange and social 
constructionist theories, predicts effects for uncertainty about the payoffs from alternative 
relations. Our hypotheses propose that power-dependence relations and uncertainty about an 
alternative relation promote the social construction of an interpersonal relationship by producing 
more frequent exchange in a focal dyad. Frequent exchange sets apart some exchange 
opportunities or dyadic relations from others, helping to make the focal relation a distinct “social 
object” (Lawler and Yoon 1993). 
 
Mutual Dependence Hypotheses 
 
 Emerson’s (1972) power dependence theory conceptualizes power as the structural 
potential to influence and distinguishes this potential from power use or actual, realized power 
(see also Cook and Emerson 1978; Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992a; Molm 1987, 
1990). In an exchange relation, A’s structural potential is a function of B’s dependence on A, and 
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B’s structural potential is a function of A’s dependence on B. Each actor’s dependence is in turn 
a positive function of the value of benefits received in exchange and an inverse function of the 
availability of such benefits from alternative relations. As with most empirical studies of power 
dependence, we hold constant the value at stake in the focal relation and examine variations in 
dependence based on the nature of the alternatives available. 
 We build on the implicit nonzero sum concept of power in power dependence theory 
(Lawler 1992a; Lawler and Ford 1993). A nonzero sum conception allows for variation in the 
total amount of power potential in a relation (i.e., mutual dependence), while a zero sum 
conception assumes that the total amount of power in a relation is fixed. The nonzero sum 
conception in power dependence is manifest, for example, in the fact that changing networks 
could give both actors in a dyad more alternatives resulting in each being less dependent on the 
other, or fewer alternatives making them more dependent. Mutual dependence can vary 
independently of relative dependence (see Lawler 1992a for more discussion). 
Emerson (1972) characterized changes in mutual dependence as changes in “relational 
cohesion,” or the structural push toward collaborative action. Relational cohesion is simply the 
difference in expected value of exchange in the focal dyad versus exchange in an alternative one 
(CLalt), averaged across actors in a dyad (Molm 1987; Lawler 1992a). In this study, we ask how 
variations in total or mutual power dependence—given equal dependence— affect exchange 
frequency and the initiation of token gifts. 
 The mutual dependence of actors in negotiated exchange captures the susceptibility of the 
exchange relation to disruption. The larger the difference between the possible benefit within the 
focal relation and the alternative, the less vulnerable the focal exchange relation because, among 
other things, there is more room for misjudgment or miscalculation. Higher total power or 
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mutual dependence means a larger number and range of negotiated agreements can meet a 
“sufficiency criterion”—that is, provide more benefits than likely from the alternative. An 
exchange relation with higher mutual dependence provides the flexibility to adapt to the 
vicissitudes of the other’s behavior and the larger network. As a result, agreements should not 
only be more frequent under higher than lower mutual dependence, but such exchange also 
should draw actors attention to their capacity to produce joint benefits and joint control in the 
negotiation context. Thus, their relation becomes an object for actors, setting up the conditions 
for ritual behavior symbolic and expressive of a person-to- relation tie. The hypotheses posit a 
three step causal chain, indicating that more mutual dependence generates more frequent 
exchange and, by increasing the frequency of exchange over time, more ritual gifts, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given equal power potential (dependence), if the mutual dependence of 
actors is high rather than low, they engage in more frequent exchange and 
increase the frequency across time. 
Hypothesis 2: In repetitive negotiations, higher mutual dependence produces more gift 
giving indirectly by increasing the frequency of exchange over time. 
 
 Previous research on dyadic negotiations has found that exchange relations with greater 
mutual dependence tend to foster more conciliatory bargaining and a greater probability of 
agreement in one-shot negotiations (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987; 
Lawler 1992a). In this prior work, each actor had complete information about each other’s 
alternatives. The present study provides actors information only on their own alternative, making 
it possible to test whether the total-power effect in previous work is contingent on actors’ 
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perceiving the dependence of each. These more limited information conditions match the 
information conditions of Emerson, Cook, and associates (Cook and Emerson 1978, 1984; Cook, 
Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi 1983); so if mutual dependence affects the frequency of 
exchange in this study, it indicates a purely structural effect for total power. 
 
Uncertainty Hypotheses 
 
 One of the most common explanations for ritual behavior in social constructionist 
writings is uncertainty reduction. Berger and Luckmann (1966) suggest objectification as a 
process by which repetitive behavior reduces uncertainty about the future and they portray ritual 
as an affirmation of the resulting sense of order and regularity. Relatedly, Wuthnow (1987) 
explicitly views uncertainty in the outside environment as shaping ritual behavior. He offers the 
following proposition: Ritual behavior is more frequent and stronger when members of a society 
or group face uncertainty because ritual evokes a shared, taken-for-granted reality that deals 
with the uncertainty. Shared realities embody actors’ moral obligations to one another and ritual 
behavior ostensibly dramatizes and brings forth these obligations in concrete social settings 
(Wuthnow 1987). 
 The conditions of uncertainty that promote ritual behavior, according to Wuthnow and 
Berger and Luckmann, are fortuitously the same sort of conditions that lead to commitment in 
exchange theory (Cook and Emerson 1984). The focus of the former is the objectification-to-
ritual sequence and the focus of the latter is the exchange behavior-to-exchange relation 
sequence. Exchange theory can explain the development of repetitive exchange among the same 
actors (i.e., the formation of exchange relations), but it does not explain how their relations then 
Mutual Dependence and Gift Giving in Exchange Relations        14 
 
become social objects for actors and the consequence this has for phenomena such as ritual 
behavior. Lawler and Yoon (1993) theorize that positive emotions produced by frequent 
exchange account for objectification. This idea produces a basis for understanding uncertainty. 
Uncertainty should foster objectification because frequent exchange in the context of uncertainty 
should produce more positive emotion than otherwise.5 
 Applied to a focal dyad within a negatively-connected exchange network, alternative 
partners in the larger network are relevant environmental conditions. Uncertainty is reflected in 
part by the subjective probabilities of various profits from exchanges with an alternative. Given 
constant expected value, the “flatter” the distribution of probabilities across a range of possible 
exchanges with the alternative, the greater the uncertainty. In this context, Wuthnow’s (1978) 
theorizing and related ideas from exchange theory (Emerson 1981) suggest the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: When actors in an exchange relation are highly uncertain about the 
benefits they are likely to receive from their respective alternative relations, they 
engage in more frequent exchange with each other and increase the frequency 
across time. 
Hypothesis 4: In repetitive negotiations, uncertainty about payoffs from alternative 
relations increase gift giving indirectly by affecting the frequency of exchange 
over time. 
 
 Some support for the impact of uncertainty on repetitive dyadic exchange is provided in a 
laboratory study by Cook and Emerson (1984). They asked whether a network with more 
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alternatives of equivalent value for each actor would produce more frequent negotiated 
agreements within select dyads. They compared two networks—a four-actor closed circle in 
which each had two potential exchange partners with an expanded network (12 actors) in which 
each of the four focal actors had two additional alternatives. The results support the hypothesis 
that the network with more uncertainty (4 alternatives each and a total of 12 actors) produced 
more frequent exchange within certain dyads. 
 To conclude, we suggest that token gifts are most likely when actors in dyadic exchange 
have substantial power over each other—that is, when the relation has more “total power” or 
mutual dependence (Emerson 1972; Bacharach and Lawler 1981). Under such conditions, actors 
are particularly likely to negotiate exchanges yielding each significantly more benefit than 
available elsewhere; and more frequent exchange, in turn, should increase their tendency to 
provide each other token gifts “without strings attached” as an expression of an emerging 
interpersonal relation. We predict the same effects and intervening processes for uncertainty as 
we do for mutual dependence, though there is a firmer theoretical and empirical backdrop for the 
hypotheses on power- dependence. 
 
METHOD 
 
 This experiment investigates a focal dyad in a negatively-connected network in which 
each focal actor has one alternative partner, and exchange in the focal relation is likely to be 
more profitable than exchange with the alternative. The actors have equal power dependence but 
know only their own dependence, that is, their own alternative. The exchange process involves 
explicit negotiations (Cook and Emerson 1978; Bacharach and Lawler 1981) rather than 
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nonnegotiated reciprocal transactions (Emerson 1981; Molm 1990). Several, repeated 
negotiation episodes occur over time in the focal dyad, and while repeated negotiations must 
occur, repeated agreements need not. The experiment adapts a standard two-party explicit 
bargaining context (Pruitt 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987; Lawler and Yoon 1993). 
 
Experimental Design and Subjects 
 
 A 2 x 2 design manipulated mutual dependence (low or high) and uncertainty of payoffs 
from the alternative partner (low or high). Fifty-two dyads (all females) were randomly assigned 
to one of the four experimental conditions (13 dyads per cell). Dyads were composed of “real” 
subjects who bargained with each other across a series of eight independent negotiation episodes. 
The primary behavioral dependent variables were the frequency of agreement during the first 
half (first four episodes), the frequency of agreement for the second half (last four episodes), and 
the number of gifts given during the last half. A post experimental questionnaire measured 
attitudinal commitment (propensity to stay in the relation), self-reports of positive feelings 
(pleasure/ happiness and interest/excitement), and the perceived closeness of the exchange 
relation. 
 
Procedures 
 
 Upon arrival, subjects took a seat in separate rooms and read written instructions 
explaining that they would bargain anonymously with a person in the next room. One of them 
represented an organization called Alpha attempting to buy a raw material (iron ore), the other an 
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organization called Beta attempting to sell the raw material. Thus, it was an intergroup setting 
with one issue, the price of iron ore. 
 Instructions indicated that the study would simulate up to 12 years of negotiation, one 
negotiation episode per year. The negotiations were separate and independent, because the price 
set for one year had no formal bearing on that in subsequent years. Each year the two 
organizations negotiated anew over the price. If an agreement was not reached in a given year, 
the price paid (by Alpha) or received (by Beta) was determined by an agreement with an 
alternative supplier or buyer. 
 As the instructions explained, the two organizations had engaged in preliminary 
discussions and their offers were quite far apart. Alpha’s representative had offered a price of 
one cent per unit, while Beta’s representative had asked for 17 cents per unit. In light of this gap, 
the subjects’ task was to negotiate on behalf of their group’s interests. Alpha was to negotiate for 
as low a price as possible, Beta for as high a price as possible. Subjects’ pay depended on the 
agreement price. 
 The instructions contained a “profit list,” indicating their own group’s profits at 17 
potential agreement prices, represented by the numbers 1 to 17. Subjects had information only on 
their own profit stated in terms of points. For Alpha an inverse, linear relationship existed 
between profit and price levels on each issue, for Beta a positive, linear relationship. Consistent 
with related work (Lawler and Bacharach 1987; Lawler, Ford, and Biegen 1988), subjects did 
not have exact information on their negotiation partner’s profit at each price level. 
 The bargaining took place via written offers across a maximum of five bargaining rounds 
in each year (episode). A round consisted of one offer by each bargainer. When making an offer, 
subjects had three options: (1) stick with and repeat their last offer, (2) accept the last offer made 
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by the other, or (3) make a counteroffer (i.e., concession). Subjects had to confine offers to one 
of the 17 price levels and they could not retract earlier concessions. 
 Negotiation continued until a price agreement emerged on the issue or until the end of the 
fifth round. If agreement was not reached, subjects received zero points (profit) from their 
negotiation, but then reached agreement with a simulated other through a drawing (see 
Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987 for similar procedures). 
 
Gift Option 
 
 The initial instructions indicated they would have the option of giving gifts later in 
negotiations.6 The later instructions, read after year four indicated “gifts allow you a way to 
express how you feel about your relationship to [the other].” The instructions likened the gifts to 
giving a person candy, flowers, or a card acknowledging a relationship. Gifts were made by 
completing a form at the end of each bargaining episode from years five through eight. On the 
form, subjects indicated whether they wished to provide a gift or not. The form served as a 
voucher that subjects could exchange for pieces of candy after the experiment. If subjects did not 
send a gift, they kept the voucher for themselves and could exchange it for additional pieces of 
candy. Importantly, the instructions indicated they would not know if the other gave them a gift 
until the experiment was over. This removed the possibility of subjects treating gifts as an 
explicit exchange. At the end of the experimental session, the experimenter brought subjects a 
large container with a variety of candy, and they chose one piece for each gift voucher. 
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Experimental Manipulations 
 
Low vs. High Mutual Dependence 
 
 Mutual dependence was manipulated by varying the expected value of the alternative (see 
Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987 for similar procedures). The expected 
value of agreement with the alternative partner was 275 points under high mutual dependence 
but 375 points under low mutual dependence. Each party had knowledge of only their own 
alternative. The expected value of the optimal (midpoint) agreement in the focal dyad was 400 
points. That they could gain more with the focal than the alternative partner is called for by the 
scope conditions for our argument. This actually provides a conservative test of mutual 
dependence effects. Even if alternatives are not as good as the focal relation, we argue that the 
quality of alternatives provide a varying power potential with implications for gift giving. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
Low vs. High Uncertainty 
 
 The probability distribution of the payoffs from the alternative manipulated uncertainty. 
In the low uncertainty condition, the probability distribution was highly peaked (leptokurtic) at 
the expected value, whereas under high uncertainty, it was flatter (platykurtic). The probability 
distributions for each experimental condition are in Table 1. 
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Dependent Measures 
 
 Three dyad-level variables reflect the causal steps in our theorizing: frequency of 
agreement during the first half (agreement frequency-1), frequency of agreement of during the 
last half (agreement frequency-2), and the number of gifts (summed across actors) during the last 
half. 
 The frequency of agreement was measured as the frequency of episodes (years) in which 
focal negotiations yielded agreement during sessions one to four and five to eight. We take the 
association of earlier (agreement frequency- 1) and later frequencies of agreement (agreement 
frequency-2) as reflecting habitualization. 
 Gift giving was measured as the average number of gift slips transferred between parties 
between episodes five to eight. Each actor could give zero or one gift at the end of each year; so, 
the dyad measure ranges from zero to eight. 
 
Post-questionnaire 
 
 Self-report measures of positive emotion or mood were included on the postquestionnaire 
administered after episode (year) eight. At the time, the subjects completed the questionnaire, 
they did not know the experiment was over. Subjects reported their feelings along a series of 
bipolar adjectives; and factor analysis yielded two dimensions that correspond to the 
pleasure/happiness (Isen 1987; Kemper 1978) and interest/excitement (Izard 1977; Deci 1975). 
This result is consistent with our earlier study (Lawler and Yoon 1993). The pleasure/happiness 
index summed four items: pleased-displeased, happy- unhappy, confident-insecure, and 
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contented-discontented (Cronbach’s alpha = .86); the interest/excitement summed three items: 
interested-dull, energetic- tired, and motivated-unmotivated (Cronbach’s alpha = .74). Dyad 
scores were the sum of individual scores.7 
 Other measures include attitudinal commitment and the perceived closeness of the 
relation (5 items). To measure the attitudinal commitment, we asked two questions: (1) “If you 
had another chance to bargain over the same issue and you could choose who you bargain with, 
how likely would you be to choose your present negotiation partner?” and (2) “If you needed to 
work with someone on a cooperative task and could choose your partner, how likely would you 
be to choose the person with whom you are negotiating?” The index of attitudinal commitment 
summed responses to each question and dyad scores summed individual scores. The zero-order 
correlation between the two items is .62. Items composing an index for perceived closeness of 
the relation included friendly- unfriendly, cooperative-competitive, close-distant, coming 
together- coming apart, and team oriented-self oriented (Cronbach’s alpha = .87).8 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Analyses of variance are used to test the predicted main effects on the frequency of 
exchange. These are the only direct effects predicted by the hypotheses. The mediating role of 
the frequency of exchange is evaluated with ordinary least- squares regression, testing the 
indirect effects of mutual dependence and uncertainty on gift giving through the frequency of 
exchange. 
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Analyses of Variance 
 
Exchange Frequency 
 
 Table 2 contains the mean frequency of agreement by experimental condition for the first 
four episodes (agreement frequency-1), the last four episodes (agreement frequency-2), and 
across all episodes (agreement frequency-T). A 2x2 analysis of variance for each measure of 
exchange frequency reveals a consistent pattern of effects—significant main effects for mutual 
dependence [F’s (1, 51) = 10.27, 6.35, and 11.73 and p’s < .001, .05, .01 respectively], and  
dependence by uncertainty interactions [F’s (1, 51) = 4,75, 3.96, 6.21, all p’s < .05]. The effect 
for power is consistent with hypothesis 1—the frequency of agreement is greater when actors are 
more dependent on each other (both have poorer alternatives), and this pattern occurs across both 
uncertainty conditions despite the interaction. In contrast, the predicted main effect (hypothesis 
3) for uncertainty does not occur (all F’s < 1). 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
 The pattern of the uncertainty by power interactions reveals the predicted positive effect 
of uncertainty on exchange frequency under low mutual dependence—higher uncertainty 
produces more frequent agreements—but the opposite effect occurs under higher mutual 
dependence. A t-test indicates that the difference in overall exchange frequency between high 
and low uncertainty conditions is marginally significant under low mutual dependence (t (52) = 
1.47, p < .10, one-tailed), while the reverse pattern under high mutual dependence does not reach 
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statistical significance (t = 1.01, ns). The interaction is too tenuous to dwell on, but the trends 
suggest the plausibility of our uncertainty prediction under lower mutual dependence and, 
importantly, the pattern for mutual dependence remains the same across both uncertainty 
conditions. The remainder of the results section will focus on the effects of mutual dependence. 
 
Exchange Frequency by Round Blocks 
 
 As an initial indicator of the “habitualization” of exchange, we conducted an analysis of 
variance by round blocks, the first four episodes constituting one block and the last four the 
second. The results reveal a block main effect, F (1, 103) = 11.15, p < .01, consistent with the 
theory. The rate of agreement is greater in the second block than in the first (M = .55 for the first 
block, .69 for the second block). There are no significant interactions of block with mutual 
dependence or uncertainty. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
 The primary test of the theory is provided by a regression analysis that determines 
whether repetitive exchange is a mediating process through which mutual dependence affects gift 
giving. In this analysis, we test a simple causal chain: High mutual dependence increases the 
exchange frequency early on (agreement frequency-1) which, in turn, increases later exchange 
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(agreement frequency-2) which, in turn, enhances gift giving. Recall that we conceptualize the 
path from power to early exchange to later exchange frequency as involving habitualization, and 
the path from later exchange frequency to gift giving as involving typification and 
objectification. These are Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) main conditions for ritual behavior. 
Table 3 contains the results. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the results indicate that mutual 
dependence (total power) affects gift giving through the growth of repetitive exchange across 
time. First, the impact of mutual dependence on early exchange frequency is quite strong (ß = 
.674) and the impact of early exchange frequency on later exchange frequency is also quite 
strong (ß = .421). Second, the direct effect of mutual dependence on later exchange frequency is 
not statistically significant when early exchange frequency is controlled. The impact of mutual 
dependence on later exchange frequency is indirect, and mediated by early exchange frequency, 
yielding an indirect effect of .284 (.674 × .421). Third, controlling for antecedent variables 
(model 3), only later exchange frequency has a significant affect on gift giving. Adding this 
effect, the indirect effect of mutual dependence on gift giving is .157. The overall implication is 
support for our main hypotheses about the indirect impact of mutual power dependence on gift 
giving. 
 
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
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Questionnaire Data 
 
Parallel Regressions 
 
 The post questionnaire data on attitudinal commitment, self-reported emotion, and 
perceived closeness of the relation can be used to corroborate the rationale underlying our 
hypothesis. There are reasonable zero-order correlations between gift giving and 
pleasure/happiness (r = .45), perceived closeness (r = .48), and attitudinal commitment (r = .21), 
making it at least plausible that these are part of a common process. If the same indirect process 
that produces gift giving also produces positive emotion, attitudinal commitment, and perceived 
closeness, this would add significant weight to the rationale for the hypotheses and to our 
inferences about gift giving in the study. Thus, we conducted parallel regression analyses that 
simply substituted attitudinal commitment, positive emotions, and perceived closeness of the 
relation for gift giving. Table 4 contains these results. 
 Mutual dependence produces attitudinal commitment (i.e., inclination to stay in the 
relation) in exactly the same way that it produces gift giving. Controlling for all antecedent 
variables, only later exchange frequency enhances attitudinal commitment to the relation (ß = 
.465, p < .01). Combining these results with those in Table 3, greater mutual dependence leads to 
more attitudinal commitment to the relation by increasing early exchange frequency and, 
indirectly, later exchange frequency. The pattern results for pleasure/ happiness is identical (ß = 
.421, p < .01) as are those for perceived closeness of the relation (ß = .541, p < .01). 
 Thus, parallel causal models for gift giving, attitudinal commitment, pleasure/happiness, 
and perceived closeness of a relation cohere nicely and this is striking. The findings, as a whole, 
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are consistent with our theorizing about expressiveness being produced by frequent exchange 
and about the role mutual dependence plays as an exogenous, structural condition. 
 
Motivation for Giving Gift 
 
 Subjects also were asked on the post-questionnaire to indicate whether they gave gifts 
because they “felt positive toward the other,” because they expected the other “would give gifts 
to [them],” or to “increase [their] own profits.” Of these items, only the first (positive feelings) 
was correlated significantly with gift giving (r = .41, p < .01). The reciprocity and profit 
motivations had negative but nonsignificant associations with gift giving (r’s = —.20, —.15, 
respectively). This offers validation to our interpretation of gift giving as expressive rather than 
instrumental behavior in this study (see Lawler and Yoon 1993 for additional evidence). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The theory and research suggests how instrumental and expressive features of dyads can 
become intertwined and produce affectively-based commitments in exchange networks (Lawler 
and Yoon 1993). We assume a situation in which people make choices jointly with others, in this 
case two-party negotiations, and in the process of making joint choices, they experience an 
“emotional buzz.” This emotion is felt individually but it also makes them more aware of 
something they share—a relation. The relation therefore becomes an object of attachment, setting 
up the conditions for expressive behavior. As a result, even people making rational choices on 
the basis of self-interest may become more willing to act on behalf of something larger—a 
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relation, group, or organization. Ritual behavior, such as token unilateral gifts, is a manifestation 
of this process. 
 An experimental laboratory setting created a purely token form of gift giving that 
involved a value domain distinct from the negotiated exchange (see Emerson 1981, 1987). The 
structural context for examining gift giving was a minimal exchange network (negatively-
connected) with two focal actors, who negotiated repeatedly and who each had an alternative 
partner from whom they could get profitable agreements, though not as profitable as in the focal 
negotiation. Their degree of dependence on each other (mutual dependence) was either low or 
high in the context of an equal power dependence relation. 
 We use Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social-constructionist explanation for ritual 
behavior to analyze gift giving as a special type of commitment behavior in negotiated social 
exchange (see Lawler and Yoon 1993). Three theoretical steps are involved in our effort to 
incorporate social- constructionist ideas within a social exchange framework: (1) conceptualizing 
repetitive exchange as “habitualizing behavior,” (2) theorizing that “objectification of an 
exchange relation” involves “typification,” that is, a definition of the relation in positive terms, 
and (3) interpreting token gifts as ritual behavior expressive of such an objectified relation. We 
argue that greater mutual dependence (or total power) in an equal-power relation is especially 
likely to foster habitualization and typification and, thereby, produce more gift giving in 
negotiated exchange. 
 The results of the experiment were consistent with our theoretical hypotheses that mutual 
dependence should enhance repetitive agreement directly and gift giving indirectly. The first step 
examined the direct effect of power dependence on the frequency of exchange early in the 
negotiations. Again, the results clearly and strongly support the power dependence hypothesis—
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high mutual dependence increased the frequency of exchange early in the repetitive negotiations. 
The second step was to test the prediction that the frequency of agreement increases from early 
to later in the negotiations. Again, the results support the prediction. In fact, when later-
agreement frequency was regressed on early-agreement frequency, controlling for the 
manipulated variables, only the early-agreement frequency had a significant effect on the later 
frequency. These results are consistent with the notion that mutual dependence fosters the 
“habitualization” of exchange. 
 The final and most important step the test of the theory examined was whether gift giving 
was produced by repetitive exchange. We argue that as the frequency of exchange cumulates or 
grows, actors “objectify” or “typify” the relation and this, in turn, leads them to initiate more gift 
giving. Our behavioral and questionnaire results support this theoretical reasoning. First, the 
regression analysis indicated that controlling for antecedent variables, the frequency of 
agreement in the later half of the negotiations significantly affected the rate of gift giving; in fact, 
none of the other variables (mutual dependence, uncertainty, early-agreement frequency) had 
significant direct effects on gift giving when later-agreement frequency was controlled. Second, 
a variety of questionnaire measures—attitudinal commitment, self reports of pleasure/ happiness, 
the closeness of the relation with the other—are not only correlated in the expected manner with 
gift giving, but also are produced through the same causal process as that producing gift giving. 
We cannot test several aspects of the theoretical rationale for the main hypotheses because the 
questionnaire was administered at the end of the experimental session, but the results of the 
questionnaire data are consistent with key parts of the reasoning underlying the behavioral 
hypotheses.9 
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 The results did not support hypotheses on the uncertainty. The hypothesis was that 
greater uncertainty attached to payoffs from alternative relations would increase the frequency of 
exchange in the focal relation and, in turn, gift giving. While there was no clear support for this 
hypothesis, the results did reveal an interesting, albeit weak, pattern. Uncertainty produces more 
agreements under low mutual dependence, while the pattern is reversed under high mutual 
dependence, though not statistically significant. This weak interaction might be interpreted as a 
framing effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
 Framing effects stem from the fact that people respond differently to prospective gains 
and prospective losses. When making a choice between prospective gains, people prefer a sure 
gain—that is, they avoid risk; thus, when choosing between losses, they prefer risk and choose 
the option with the less certain losses. These framing effects are diminished if there are large 
differences of expected value (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In our experiment, actors were 
only choosing among prospective gains. Lower mutual dependence should produce the framing 
effects of prospective gains; thus, when people are less mutually dependent they should be more 
averse to risk and reach more agreements in the focal relation. Under high mutual dependence 
the framing effects should be weaker or “wash out,” because of a large difference of expected 
value between the focal and alternative relation. The significant interaction of uncertainty and 
mutual dependence is generally consistent with this framing interpretation. Frequent exchange 
among the same actors may involve uncertainty-avoidance behavior instead of uncertainty-
reduction behavior, the basis of our original hypothesis. 
 In combination with an earlier study (Lawler and Yoon 1993), there is now significant 
support for the idea that structural power (equal vs. unequal dependence and mutual dependence) 
affects token gift giving indirectly through the frequency of exchange. Lawler and Yoon (1993) 
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provide support for the hypothesis that an emotional/ affective process accounts for the positive 
impact of exchange frequency on gift behavior, and the present study incorporates a social-
constructionist account of how the “objectification of the exchange relation,” a cognitive process, 
promotes ritualized gift giving. While the results are consistent with this overarching theorizing, 
evidence for the objectification process and for ritualization is inferential because we have not 
directly tested the role of these. Future work should bring together the two dimensions of 
structural power in a single theoretical formulation and, in this context, explicate further and 
directly test the predicted relationship between the emotional/ affective and objectification 
processes. 
 
Broader Implications 
 
 This theory and research should be viewed as having a complementary relationship to 
rational choice explanations for commitment formation. The most basic idea from rational choice 
is that repetitive exchange between the same actors will emerge and continue as long as the 
expected value of payoffs within the focal relation exceed those available from alternative 
relations (Elster 1986). The experiment establishes power dependence conditions that produce 
such a difference in expected value, and one can interpret the impact of mutual dependence on 
repetitive exchange in rational choice terms. Our theory suggests, however, that in the course of 
producing repetitive exchange, power dependence (structural) conditions also engender incipient 
group formation in the dyad due to the emotional/affective consequences of actors jointly dealing 
with and resolving negotiation problems. 
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 Using rational choice principles, social exchange theory can provide a good explanation 
for how and why a pattern of repetitive exchange comes about, but not for the emotional and 
affective consequences of repeated and profitable exchange. Moreover, neither exchange theory 
nor other related perspectives, such as transaction-costs economics, can explain actors’ tendency 
to give each other token benefits “without strings attached.” The explanation in our theory is that 
the objectification of the exchange relation leads to behavior expressive of that relation. The 
process of objectification starts with the “emotional buzz” involved in actors accomplishing a 
joint task, this makes the relation more salient as an object and a target for affective attachment 
(Lawler 1992b; Lawler and Yoon 1993; Markovsky and Lawler 1994). The basic result is 
emergent group formation within the dyad or “incipient institutionalization” in Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) terms. Incipient institutionalization promotes the initiation of ritual behavior 
symbolic of the relevant social entity, in this case, the dyad. 
 Overall, the research suggests how endogenous processes in dyads within a minimal 
exchange network, produce a particularly important form of commitment behavior: gift giving. 
For theoretical reasons, we focus on the early stages of an exchange relation and treat the 
initiation of gifts where actors do not know if the other is similarly inclined. The purpose is to 
understand how and when exchange relations begin to take on expressive properties. When this 
occurs, the emerging tie within the dyad is likely to have ramifications for the larger network. If 
members of the dyad interact more with each other and become affectively attached to their 
relation, then their relations with others in the larger network will change, and the relation of 
those others to still others also will change. Endogenous processes, like those we identify, are a 
starting point for important micro-to-macro effects in exchange networks. 
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 In a recent theory of group solidarity, Markovsky and Lawler (1994) indicate that when 
an actor experiences positive emotion in repeated interaction with members of a group, they will 
begin to view the group as an object and become attached to it as well. The objectification of an 
exchange relation may spread in this way to a larger group or network and serve as a foundation 
for group- oriented action (see also Lawler 1992b). Our theory predicts that objectification of the 
larger group would enhance the per capita rate of gift giving among group members and, more 
generally, what Organ (1990) and others have termed “organizational citizenship behavior,” that 
is, the willingness to do extra, unrequired, and uncompensated things. 
 An important further question is how “incipient institutionalization” in an exchange 
relation might give rise to more “sedimented institutionalization.” Berger and Luckmann (1966, 
pp. 57-60) suggest that habitualization and typification are sufficient for incipient 
institutionalization but that a “third force” is necessary for emerging institutional patterns to 
“harden.” The third force may constitute a specific or generalized other or a referential structure 
that justifies and legitimizes the developing patterns of behavior. At the level of a dyad, 
“sedimented institutionalization” is implied if the dyadic relation becomes so close that members 
not only reduce contact with others in the network in favor of interaction in the focal relation but 
act as if these alternatives are not present or are irrelevant. One indicator of such a condition is a 
decrease in the degree that actors attend to or think about the alternative during negotiations. 
 The post-questionnaire of the experiment contains some relevant evidence. One item 
asked actors how much they thought about the alternative during the negotiations and another 
asked whether the alternative became more or less important to them in the later episodes of 
bargaining. The results are generally consistent with the behavioral data. Higher mutual 
dependence reduced the degree that subjects reported thinking about the alternative and (F = 
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3.95, p < .05) and under low uncertainty in particular, higher mutual dependence reduced the 
perceived importance in the later episodes (interaction effect F = 4.21, p < .05). Also as one 
would expect, gift giving was negatively associated with each of these items (r’s = —.27 and —
.26, p’s < .05 and .06, respectively). Thus, there is some indication that incipient group formation 
promoted the sort of perceptions important to sedimentation or the “hardening” of 
institutionalization in Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) terms. 
 Another condition, reflecting a “hardening of institutionalization,” is that the relation 
exerts a moral/ normative constraint on actors. The transition from incipient to sedimented 
institutionalization is a possible way to examine how and when the emotional/affective processes 
produce a relation that exerts a moral/normative constraint on actors. In our theorizing, relations 
that “enable” actors to jointly resolve problems and produce mutual benefits ostensibly become 
objects for positive feelings of accomplishment (see Lawler 1992b). Projecting such a process 
further, we hypothesize that exchange relations which “enable” actors to do things (i.e., provide 
opportunities for choice, etc.) also come to “constrain” them as moral obligations are associated 
with the relation and informal or formal sanctioning emerges. The moral/ normative character of 
exchange relations can develop from emotional/ affective processes that, in turn, have their 
source in rational choices about who to exchange with. This is a broader view of how micro 
social orders develop from negotiated exchange. Future theoretical and empirical work should 
address this. 
 To conclude, exchange networks create differential power-dependence among actors or 
positions and also varying levels of mutual dependence among component dyadic relations. The 
paper suggests, theoretically and empirically, how mutual dependencies in a social structure can 
foster incipient commitment and gift giving. The underlying process is that frequent exchange 
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among the same actors engenders positive emotion and leads them to objectify the dyadic 
relation and engage in rudimentary forms of ritual behavior. Thus, structurally- based 
dependencies, by shaping frequencies of exchange in given dyads, stimulate emotional and 
cognitive processes that add expressive components to instrumental exchange relations. 
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Notes 
 
1. We assume a dyad embedded in a larger exchange network and focus solely on exchange 
that is explicit and negotiated (Cook and Emerson 1978; Lawler and Yoon 1993) rather than 
implicit and nonnegotiated (Molm 1990,1992). The exchange opportunity occurs repeatedly, 
given the social structure (i.e., network), and endogenous processes within dyads are the 
proximal causes of ritual behavior. 
2. Gift giving is central to what Ekeh (1974) terms generalized exchange, exemplified by 
the Kula Ring (Malinowski 1922). The contrast of gift exchange with negotiated exchange in 
Emerson (1981) and Akerlof (1982) resembles Ekeh’s (1974) contrast between generalized and 
restricted exchange. The idea is that gifts both reflect and reproduce trust, commitment, and 
cohesion in instrumental relations (e.g., Akerlof 1982, 1984; Ekeh 1974). We take this to imply 
that if people are willing to make token, unilateral gifts, an element of expressiveness has been 
introduced into a purely instrumental exchange relation. 
3. If third parties legitimize such a reciprocal typification over time, the institutional objects 
“harden and thicken,” that is, become sedimented (see Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 59). This 
should enhance the constraining effect of a relation or group in an emerging micro order. 
4. The proposition assumes a key idea from Lawler and Yoon (1993)—namely that 
repetitive exchange fosters objectification through an emotional process. People ostensibly get an 
“emotional buzz” from accomplishing a joint task with others, such as reaching agreements, and 
this makes their relation more salient as a unit. This process was documented empirically in a 
prior study (Lawler and Yoon 1993); here we assume it and focus on the objectification-to-ritual 
link. 
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5. The implications of uncertainty have also been examined in organizational studies of 
contracting (Williamson 1975, 1981; Pfeffer, Salanczik, and Leblebici 1978; Ouchi 1979). 
Organizational studies suggest that uncertainties due to the lack of information and the presence 
of opportunism increase transaction costs and thereby make market price mechanisms inefficient. 
Given such uncertainties, contracts internalize market transactions into a hierarchical 
organizational structure (Williamson 1975, 1981) or act as a substitute for trust in transactions 
(Okun 1981). Whatever the organizational form or underpinnings, the broad arguments in this 
literature dovetail with our approach. A key difference is that we offer a social-constructionist 
account that emphasizes the emotional/ affective consequences of repeated agreements 
(contracts) between the same individual actors. 
6. These initial instructions prevented later instructions from being a surprise. Lawler and 
Yoon’s (1993) study indicated that this early mention of the gift giving option did not produce a 
“mental set.” 
7. Lawler and Yoon (1993) propose pleasure/happiness and interest/excitement as two 
facets of positive emotion. Based on Izard (1977) and recent analyses of the circumflex model of 
emotion (Watson 1988; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988; Watson and Tellegen 1985), they 
define pleasure/happiness as “feeling gratified” and interest / excitement as “feeling energized.” 
Consistent with these expectations, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization showed two 
factors with the following factor loadings: For the pleasure/happiness dimension, pleased-
displeased (.94), happy-unhappy (.91), confident-insecure (.56), and contented-discontented 
(.79); for the interest/excitement dimension, interested-dull (.73), energetic-tired (.78), and 
motivated-unmotivated (.84). The zero- order correlation between the two dimensions was —
.091. 
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8. Principal component factor analysis confirmed one factor and the factor loadings are as 
follows: friendly-unfriendly (.79), cooperative-competitive (.68), close-distant (.76), coming 
together-coming apart (.86), and team oriented-self-oriented (.82). 
9. In Lawler and Yoon (1993), equal power was compared to unequal power (holding total 
power or mutual dependence constant), and the results were that equal power produced more 
interest/excitement indirectly through more frequent exchange; equal power did not increase 
pleasure/ happiness. The current study held equal power constant and found that more mutual 
dependence in the relation indirectly produced more pleasure/ happiness, but there was no effect 
on interest/excitement. Both studies indicate that positive emotions mediate the impact of 
structural power, but different dimensions of positive emotion are important. Perhaps, greater 
mutual dependence (total power) enhances the pleasure/happiness derived from negotiated 
agreements, whereas inequalities of dependence dampen interest/excitement developed within 
the negotiation process. 
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